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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 990793-CA

BARBARA DEHART,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for obstruction of justice, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1 )(b-c), (2) (1999). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the State present sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of
obstructing justice independent of defendant's extrajudicial post-crime admissions?
Standard of Review: "[T]he determination of whether the corpus delicti rule has
been satisfied is a question of law, and we give no deference to the trial court's ruling, but
review it under a correctness standard." State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,1186 (Utah App.
1994). See also State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991).

Issue 2: Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction for obstruction
ofjustice?
Standard of Review: In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a
conviction, an appellate court views "'the evidence and all inferences which maybe drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,
343 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). An appellate
court will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence is so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." Id. (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statute is applicable to the issue on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306. Obstructing Justice.
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder, prevent, or delay
the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another
for the commission of a crime, he:
(b) harbors or conceals the offender;
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other
means for avoiding discovery or apprehension; [or]
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence that might aid
in the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the person;
(2) An offense under Subsections (1 )(a) through (f) is a class B misdemeanor,
unless the actor knows that the offender committed a capital offense or a
felony of the first degree, in which case the offense is a second degree felony.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in an amended information, dated December 15, 1998, with
one count of second degree felony obstructing justice (R. 5, 14). At trial, defendant moved
to dismiss the charge at the end of the State's case-in-chief on the ground that the State
presented insufficient evidence to prove the corpus delicti independent of defendant's
statements (R. 211:189-91). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the State did
adduce sufficient independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti (R. 211:196-99).
The jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 105-07). In rendering its verdict, the jury
unanimously found that defendant had obstructed justice in two ways: 1) defendant "harbored
or concealed the offender," and 2) defendant had "provided the offender with a weapon,
transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or apprehension" (R. 105-06).
Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment on August 2, 1999 (R. 142). The trial
court denied the motion on September 2, 1999, just before imposing sentence (R. 160; R.
213:5). The trial court sentenced defendant to one to fifteen years in prison and fined her
$ 1,000 (R. 167-69). The court suspended the prison term and placed defendant on thirty-six
months probation, which included serving one year in jail (R. 167-69).
Defendant timely appealed her conviction (R. 172).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, Barbara DeHart, helped her boyfriend John Pinder hide from and evade
police after he murdered two people and blew up their bodies. Unless otherwise stated, the
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following details are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v.
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f2, 399 Utah Adv. Rep. 20; State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah
1996).
The remains of a human hip socket
On the night of October 30, 1998, officers waited just outside the Pinder Ranch in
Duchesne County for a search warrant (R. 210:36). While waiting, Deputy Johnson saw
what appeared to be the remains of a human hip socket just a few feet from the road (R.
210:36,43). The officers received the warrant at about 10:00 p.m., but waited until morning
to enter the ranch (R. 210:37)
On the ranch, the officers found body parts, "a lot of small pieces," strewn over an
area of over 300 to 400 square feet (R. 210:37-38, 46-47). Some of the body parts were
buried under the dirt, some lay on the surface, and some hung off the branches of sage brush
(R. 210:46-47).
The largest body part was the upper torso of Rex Tanner, which included his chest
from about mid-sternum, part of one arm, and his head (R. 210:38-39). The officers also
found two legs clad in mismatched socks and the remnants of a pair of pants (R. 210:38-39).
A wrapperfroma bag of the explosive compound prell was wrapped around one of the legs
(R. 210:38-39). Other body parts included a uterusfroma postmenopausal woman with part
of the vaginal tract still attached (R. 210:50). The woman was later identified as June Flood,
Rex Tanner's girlfriend (R. 210:19, 22-25, 53).
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The medical examiner determined from Tanner's torso that he had suffered blunt force
injuries before death and that he had died from multiple gunshot wounds (R. 210:49-50).
There were not enough body parts to determine the cause of Flood's death (R. 210:49-50).
The medical examiner did determine, however, that both bodies had been blown up after
death (R. 210:49-50).
A cave north of the Pinder ranch house contained a stack of Burn Mix prell sacks, the
same brand name appearing on the partial prell wrapper stuck to one of the legs (R. 210:4041). The numbers on the bags also matched the numbers on the partial wrapper (R. 210:4041). Some of the bags had been broken, andfreshprell granules had spilled onto the ground
(R. 210:41-42).
Neither Tanner nor Flood had been seen or heard from since Sunday, October 25,
1998, although Flood had promised to call herfriendon Monday, and Tanner was expected
at his family's home on Wednesday (R. 210:20-21,25,27). On Thursday, afriendchecked
on the pair to discover their house in disarray and their wallphone missing (R. 210:21-24).
Big Mess
The previous month, defendant had left Kurt DeHart, her husband of twenty-six years,
for John Pinder (R. 211:72,104-05,138-39, 204-07). The DeHarts had known Pinder for
fifteen years; Pinder had once employed both the DeHarts, and he owned a home less than
a quarter of a mile awayfromtheir Cataldo, Idaho home (R. 211:72,138,207-08). Kurt and
Pinder had been good friends to this point (R. 211:151).
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On Monday, October 26, 1998, at about 11:30 a.m., defendant called her daughter
Melissa Cowles from Pinder's Utah ranch (R. 211:75). Defendant was upset because Pinder
and his ranch hand Filo "had been out all night and... she had made a really nice dinner and
they never showed" (R. 211:75, 220). Defendant suspected that Pinder "was cheating on
her" (R. 211:75). Defendant abruptly ended the conversation when Pinder drove up (R.
211:76).
"Frantic" and "upset," defendant called Melissa a half hour later, saying, "Big mess,
Missy. Big mess. It's horrible here. I just want to come home" (R. 211:76,93). Defendant
added that she could not tell Melissa about it "over the phone," but that it was "just horrible"
(R. 211:76, 93).
Defendant also called her husband that morning, telling him that "things had happened
down there" (R. 211:139). She told her husband that he "wouldn't believe it and she was
really — she sounded scared . . . . " (R. 211:139, 154-55). Defendant also did not tell her
husband what had happened, but said that she was coming home that day (R. 211:139).
A calmer defendant called Melissa on Tuesday to say that she and Pinder were
meeting with his attorneys and that they would be in Cataldo on Friday, October 30, with a
cage and meat for Pinder's pet lion (R. 211:76-77). Defendant called again that week, but
Melissa thought her mother was unusually "standoffish" and that "something was bugging
her" (R. 211:77).
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Driving Pinder's blue Dodge pickup truck and pulling a horse trailer, defendant and
Pinder arrived in Cataldo on Halloween morning, Saturday, October 31 (R. 211:77-78,79).
Defendant's husband allowed them to stay in his home because he had plans to be gone that
weekend (R. 211:78, 140). Defendant went next door to Melissa's house around 9:00 that
morning (R. 211:77). Defendant "was pacing back and forth and she said that Filo had been
arrested. There had been a murder out on John's ranch and that Filo had been arrested and
that [she and Pinder] may have to go back to Utah for questioning" (R. 211:78).
Defendant called Melissa's house Sunday morning, November 1 (R. 211:80).
Defendant "was panicking" (R. 211:80). Defendant told Melissa that Pinder "had told her
everything, that he admitted to the murders of the people on the ranch, that he admitted to
killing people on the ranch" (R. 211:80).
Defendant also called her father that morning (R. 211:300). She told him that Pinder
"had killed two people and that she was going to be implicated in the crime because she had
helped him dispose of some of the evidence" (R. 211:301). Defendant said that she and
Pinder "had dropped some of the bloody clothing and some of the other evidence in small
towns on the wayfromDuchesne to northern Idaho" (R. 211:301). Defendant told her father
that she had cleaned Pinder's truck and that the victims had been shot and then blown up (R.
211:301).
Defendant went to Melissa's house at about 10:30 that morning (R. 211:80). She
repeated that Pinder "had admitted that he had killed the people on the ranch, the ranch hand
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and his girlfriend," and added that "they had taken the truck to a carwash and that she had
found bloody hair and scalp, is how she put it, underneath the passenger seat of his truck in
a bag, and she had thrown it in the garbage" (R. 211:81).
Defendant also said that she had burned Pinder's bloody clothes and that they had
thrown the murder weapon into the river (R. 211:82). Defendant commented that Melissa's
"soon to be step-daddy is a murderer," and that her "mother is a criminal and we're just like
Bonnie and Clyde, always on the run" (R. 211:82-83, 96). Melissa's husband, Damien,
overheard this conversation (R. 211:127-35).
Defendant called Melissa later that afternoon and "[h]er whole story had changed" (R.
211:83). Defendant now claimed that "Filo and Dave had planted the evidence in [Pinder's]
truck and that [Pinder] was innocent, and that the reason they had cleaned up the evidence
was that she didn't want [Pinder] to get in trouble for something he didn't do" (R. 211:83).
When Melissa asked her mother why she had a different story, defendant replied, "I don't
know, Miss/' (R. 211:84). Melissa recalled that about a week before the homicides,
defendant had mentioned that Pinder had "a grudge against Rex Tanner and June Flood" (R.
211:113).

Defendant then confided to Melissa that she had talked Pinder out of

"throwing his truck over the cliff'and into leaving it at his Cataldo home, while the two
returned to Utah in defendant's white Toyota 4-Runner (R. 211:84). "That way," explained
defendant, "they wouldn't get pulled over by the cops as easy" because "[n]obody would
recognize her 4-Runner as [Pinder's] truck on their way back to Utah" (R. 211:84).
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Pinder and defendant left Idaho in defendant's 4-Runner that day, Sunday, November
1 (R. 211:86, 237). They left Pinder's pickup in his driveway, and the horse trailer next to
defendant's Cataldo home (R. 211:86,141-42). Melissa called police that day and told them
what she knew (R. 211:84).
Pinder: "Thanks Kurt.. . . You just signed my fucking death warrant" (R.211:143)
Defendant called Melissa a few times after she and Pinder left Idaho (R. 211: 84-85).
Defendant first asked Melissa if she had talked to police (R. 211:85). Melissa lied at first and
said, "No" (R. 211:85). Her mother responded, "Good. Don't tell them anything" (R.
211:85). However, on a subsequent call, defendant "went ballistic" when Melissa told her
that she had in fact talked to police (R. 211:85). Defendant encouraged Melissa to tell police
that she had "lied, that [she] made up the whole story" (R. 211:85,99). Defendant also asked
Melissa if police had searched the horse trailer (R. 211:86,99-100). When Melissa said that
no one had, defendant replied, "Good. Don't let them" (R. 211:87,99-100).
Defendant's husband returned to his home on Monday, November 2, to find defendant
and Pinder already gone (R. 211:140). In the spare room closet, Kurt discovered a "bunch
of rifles" that Pinder had left and a maroon gym bag (R. 211:140). The gym bag contained
several items, most of them in "baggies" or "sandwich bags" (R. 211:140-41). The items
included, "people's ID, letters to [Pinder], there was a bag of hair. . . . It appeared to be
human hair, like somebody had cut somebody's hair and put it in a bag" (R. 211:141,176).
Kurt also found a dark stocking cap and a t-shirt with what appeared to be blood stains (R.
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211:140-41). Kurt turned the bag, rifles, and other items over to police (R. 211:141-42).l
On Tuesday, November 3, defendant called her husband to see if police had come or
taken anything (R. 211:142). Defendant specifically asked if they had taken the gym bag (R.
211:142). When Kurt said, "Yes," defendant said to someone else, "They got the bag" (R.
211:142). Kurt then heard Pinder yell from the background, "Thanks Kurt. Thanks a lot.
You just signed my fucking death warrant" (R. 211:143, 152).
KSL Interview
On Wednesday, November 4, shortly before midnight, Pinder and defendant appeared
at the KSL television studio so that Pinder could "tell his side of the story, what was going
on out there" (R. 211:157, 245-46). Defendant sat next to Pinder during the 45-minute
videotaped interview (R. 211:157). During the interview, defendant claimed that Pinder had
been with her the entire night of the murders, although police had not yet released the date
of the murders (R. 211:164,246-47, 272). At trial, defendant was unable to state how she
knew what night the murders occurred and she finally acknowledged that Pinder was the
most likely source for that information (R. 211:272-74). A segment at the end of the
videotape showed Pinder driving defendant away in her white Toyota 4-Runner shortly after
midnight (R. 211:157-58).

*DNA testing later revealed that the blood on the t-shirt was Pinder's (R. 211: 17576, 183). The hair was also sent out for DNA testing, but the record does not reflect the
results (R. 211:176, 183).
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False license plate number
Less than seven hours later, at 6:48 a.m. on November 5, defendant checked into the
Virgin River Hotel in Mesquite, Nevada (R. 211:159-60). The registration form reflected
defendant's correct name and address and that she was driving a white 1997 Toyota 4Runner (R. 211:159-160). Although her Toyota carried Idaho license plates, defendant wrote
on the registration form that her truck had Utah license plates (R. 211:160). Defendant also
wrote a false license plate number on the form (R. 211:160).
Defendant wrote on the registration that two persons would be staying in the room (R.
211:160). The registration clerk remembered and identified defendant, but never saw the
other person staying in the room (R. 211:160). The room was vacated by the next morning,
November 6 (R. 211:160).
Defendant: "For all I know that's dog or elk hair" (R. 211:172).
Defendant returned alone to her Cataldo home around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on November
7 (R. 211:173-74, 251). Defendant had called about 45 minutes to an hour before arriving
to discover that Sergeant Wallace Hendricks, a Duchesne County deputy sheriff, was there
to talk to her (R. 211:173). Sergeant Hendricks had wanted to speak to defendant sooner, but
did not know how to contact her (R. 211:173-74). Although Pinder had not yet been charged
or named as a suspect, Sergeant Hendricks had also been trying to contact Pinder (R.
211:174-75). Sergeant Hendricks had been speaking with Pinder's attorneys during the
previous week to "try[] to get them to convince [Pinder] to come talk to me or put me in
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touch with him either by telephone or in person, somehow" (R. 211:175). Hendricks' efforts
had been unsuccessful to that point (R. 211:171-72, 175).
When defendant arrived, Sergeant Hendricks "began to tell her the severity of the
investigation [they] were conducting concerning a homicide in Utah" (R. 211:171).
Hendricks told defendant about the evidence they were finding and "that people had been
telling [him] that she was involved" (R. 211:171-72). Hendricks added that they "knew
about a bag that she had thrown away from under the seat of the truck at the carwash" (R.
211:171 -72). Defendant nodded her head, and said, "I have four attorneys in Utah telling me
to tell you for all I know that's dog or elk hair" (R. 211:172).
Defendant told Hendricks that "she had been driving [Pinder] around," and that "she
had dropped [Pinder] off in Las Vegas the day before (R. 211:171). Defendant also told
Hendricks that she had given Pinder her handgun, which she described as a Browning .380
caliber semiautomatic (R. 211:171).
Defendant's testimony
Defendant testified that Pinder was with her the entire night of Sunday, October 25
(R. 211:218-22). She acknowledged having called Melissa on Monday, October 26, but
denied having said that "[t]here are horrible things going on down here" (R. 211:223).
Defendant explained she was unhappy at the time because she and Pinder had had a fight that
weekend and she had decided that she "didn't like living here . . . didn't like some of the
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people and [she] was uncomfortable there. . . . [She] wanted to go home" (R. 211:223).
Defendant denied being aware of the homicides that morning (R. 211:223).
Defendant stated that she went to Roosevelt for supplies on Tuesday morning (R.
211:265). As soon as she returned that afternoon, she took lunch and cigarettes to defendant,
who was working on another part of the ranch (R. 211:264-65). When she arrived, she found
defendant sitting atop a caterpillar tractor moving dirt (R. 211:266). Defendant denied seeing
any body parts at the time (R. 211:266).
According to defendant, she and Pinder stayed in a Heber City motel that night, and
on Wednesday, Pinder met with his lawyers, "business . . . not criminal," in Salt Lake City
(R. 211:225). Defendant stated that on Thursday they had a hitch put on Pinder's truck and
then returned to the ranch to get the horse trailer, which ranch hands had loaded at Pinder's
instruction (R. 211:225-26). Defendant disclaimed knowing what was in the trailer (R.
211:253).
Defendant testified that she and Pinder began driving to Idaho Thursday night and
they stopped in Tremonton, Utah for the night (R. 211:225-26). Defendant stated that on
Saturday, Halloween, Pinder's mother called him on his cell phone and told him that police
had a search warrant and had found two bodies on the ranch (R. 211:227-28,231). Pinder
then called one of his lawyers to accompany Pinder's father to the ranch (R. 211:229-30).
After that, Pinder was "on the phone all the time" (R. 211:231). Towards the evening on
Halloween, one of Pinder's lawyers advised him to return to Utah (R. 211:231).
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Defendant claimed that this was the first she had heard of the murders and that all of
her information had come through Pinder (R. 211:229-31,242-43). Defendant testified that
to this day, she still did not know what night the murders happened (R. 211:230).
Defendant testified that after they left Cataldo, Pinder was in constant contact with
his attorneys who told him that he did not have to come in until he was charged (R. 211:237239). Defendant acknowledged that she was with Pinder on November 2 when he met with
attorneys in Salt Lake and that she participated in those discussions (R. 211:237, 242).
Defendant claimed that the attorneys told them to "stay in touch" and that the attorneys
would advise them if Pinder became a suspect or if they needed to talk to defendant (R.
211:238-39).
Defendant testified that after leaving the KSL television studio, she and Pinder drove
all night to Nevada (R. 211:247,248,275-76,277). Defendant claimed that the morning of
November 5, Pinder learned from his lawyers that there was a warrant out for his arrest (R.
211:250). According to defendant, the lawyers advised the two to separate and defendant to
return to her home (R. 211:250). Defendant stated that she then dropped Pinder off at a truck
stop just outside Las Vegas, and that she doubled back to Mesquite where she checked into
the Virgin River Hotel alone (R. 211:247-50). Defendant explained that she mistakenly
wrote that two people were staying in the room and the wrong license plate number because
she was tired and confused from driving all night (R. 211:247-50, 275-77).
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Defendant denied that she took the truck to a carwash, threw out or burned bloody
clothes, threw out anything that looked like a scalp, or threw a gun into a river (R. 211:229,
234-25). Defendant further denied having told her daughter, husband, or father that she had
done any of these things (R. 211:234-236, 252-53). Defendant also claimed that she never
spoke with her daughter or husband about not allowing the police to search the horse trailer
or maroon gym bag and that Pinder never said anything about Kurt signing his death warrant
(R. 211:241,252-53). Defendant disclaimed having given her gun to Pinder, and could not
recall telling Sergeant Hendricks that she had done so (R. 211:249). At trial, defendant stated
that she had given her gun to Pinder's father before they drove to Nevada and that he had
returned it to defendant two months later (R. 211:249).
Special Verdict
With the parties' agreement, the trial court gave the jury a special verdict form which
asked the jury to specify which of three alternatives it had unanimously agreed on in finding
defendant guilty of obstructing justice (R. 105-06; R. 211:65). The three alternatives were
that having the intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution,
conviction, or punishment of another for the crimes of aggravated murder or murder, 1)
defendant harbored or concealed the offender, 2) defendant provided the offender with a
weapon, transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or apprehension, or
3) defendant concealed, destroyed, or altered any physical evidence that might aid in the
discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the offender (R. 105-06). The jury checked the
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first two alternatives, but left the third one blank (R. 106). A copy of the special verdict form
is attached as Addendum A.
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument section.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the corpus delicti
independent of her extrajudicial admissions. Defendant's statements made prior to and
during the commission of her crime, however, are not subject to the corpus delicti rule.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was more than sufficient to
establish the corpus delicti of obstructing justice independent of her few post-crime
staiements.
Defendant also argues that the evidence as a whole was insufficient to support her
conviction for obstructing justice. The record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the jury verdict, refutes that claim.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MAJORITY OF DEFENDANT'S EXTRAJUDICIAL
STATEMENTS WERE NOT SUBJECT TO THE CORPUS DELICTI
RULE BECAUSE THEY WERE MADE BEFORE AND DURING THE
COMMISSION OF HER CRIME; SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
INDEPENDENT OF DEFENDANT'S POST-CRIME ADMISSIONS
ESTABLISHED THE CORPUS DELICTI
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of
her crime independent of her many statements to her daughter, husband, father, and police.
16
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e
Cazier,

521 P.2dat555. See also State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39,41-42 (Utah 1987) (finding corpus
delicti of rape independently proven without regard to proof of nonmarriage, an essential
element of rape at that time); see also Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 (state not required to show
independent evidence that "accused was the guilty agent"); Knoefler, 563 P.2d at 176 (same).
Rather, the independent evidence must show only two things: 1) "[t]hat a wrong, an injury,
or a damage has been done," and 2) "that such was effected by a criminal agency, i.e.,
without right or by unlawful means." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
The corpus delicti may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences that may be drawnfromthe evidence. State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,
1188 (Utah App. 1994); Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah App. 1993);
State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978,980 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800,801-02
(Utah 1979); see State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061,1062-63 (Utah 1977) (inferring corpus
delicti of automobile homicidefromcircumstances of accident), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1979). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence
establishing the corpus delicti, the evidence and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the State's case or the verdict. State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 517
(Utah 1980). In Utah, proof of the corpus delicti must be by clear and convincing evidence.
Johnson, 821 P.2dat 1163.
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and, therefore, the corpus delicti doctrine's requirement of corroboration [is] not necessary."
Id. v M62 {quoting Warszower v United States, **1? T T S. 342, 347, 61 S Ct «<H >«n*
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1164 (using pre-crime admission in determining that corpus delicti had been pro\ ed
independent of defendant's post-crime admissions).2
B

1 he corpus delicti rule applies only to defendant's post-crime statements
to police and not to her pre-crime and contemporaneous statements to her
daughter.

Defendant s statements after she and Pinder arrived in Idaho. Defendant does not
claim that the corpus delicti rule applies to any of her telephone statements to her daughter

"Defendant correctly points out that the corpus delicti rule arises in two contexts:
1) as a foundational requirement for the admission of a defendant's post-crime admission
or confession, e.g., Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1160-62, and 2) as a post-trial review to
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti
independent of the accused's admissions, e.g, State v. Hansen, 557 P.2d 978 (Utah App.
1993). Defendant does not challenge on appeal, nor did she below, the admissibility of
any of her statements She argues only that the evidence independent of her admissions
was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti. Br. Aplt 8 9
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or husband before she and Pinder arrived in Idaho for the Halloween weekend. Br. Aplt. 1213. She does, however, argue that the rule should apply to the following statements she made
to her daughter after she arrived in Idaho:
1. Defendant's statement on October 30, 1998, that Filo Ruiz had been
arrested for murder and that she and Pinder may have to return to Utah for
questioning (R. 211:78).
2. Defendant's statement on November 1, 1998, that Pinder had told her that
he had admitted to committing the two murders on his ranch (R. 211:80).
3. Defendant's statements that she had helped Pinder clean his truck of blood,
hair, something that looked like a scalp, and that she had burned bloody
clothes and helped dispose of the murder weapon (R. 211:81-82).
Br. Aplt. 13-14.
The first two statements were made before the commission of the offense under the
two alternatives specifically found by the jury's special verdict: 1) harboring or concealing
the offender and 2) providing the offender with transportation or a weapon (R. 105-06). The
third statement, which relates to concealing or destroying evidence, was arguably made after
defendant completed that alternative (R. 106). However, because the jury did not find that
defendant concealed or destroyed evidence, it clearly did not convict her based on those
statements alone (R. 106). Therefore, the State will only address the applicability of the rule
to the first two statements. Moreover, because the evidence independent of the third
statement was more than sufficient to support the corpus delicti of the two alternatives found
by the jury, this brief will not use the third statement in analyzing the evidence.
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support this claim, defendant alleges that her daughter was angry at her for leaving her
husband and therefore had a general motive to lie about the statements, thai
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* that def ^ .\< r h-icl i MIII ealed or destroyed evidence. Br.

The State disputes that Melissa's report of her mother's statements lacks credibility.
While Melissa may have been unhappy about hei

r

i fled that

'.In: I : \ a i liei m<: EIICI, .mini Ii nth In Im
' ,„(iiil (IHaicliiifs testimony reflected a relatively close
relationship until the murders (R. 211.88-8!), 103-06). Defendant attended the birth of
Melissa's second child, even though this occurred after she had left her husband lur Finder,
but before the murders (R. i. I l

I

I I

Melissa li lltinr lil.ihn homr Ini

IIIIIIIIM

\ U'w ii«i s li I Hi i nitinnJciiii mild Pinder mruirii

(K "!11:751 Defendant called Melissa nearly ever>

day after she went to stay with Pinder in Utah (R. 21.1:74). Defendant often cared for her
first grandchild, and continued to care for her grandchildren even after she had been I'huijjeU
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(R. 211:205-06, 213). Thus, while Melissa may have had a general motive to lie, she also
had very good reasons for not wanting to falsely accuse her mother.
Melissa also reported her mother's statements as soon as she left Idaho with Pinder
(R. 211:84). The contemporaneousness of the report, coupled with her concern that her
mother was driving around with a professed murderer (R. 211:84-85), only add to the
credibility of Melissa's testimony about her mother's statements. The fact that the jury did
not unanimously find that defendant concealed or destroyed evidence does not undercut the
statements' reliability. As the "sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the
weight of the testimony," a jury has the prerogative to "believe or disbelieve, accept or reject,
the whole or a part of the testimony of any witness." State v. Morris, 40 Utah 431, 122 P.
380,383-84 (1912); accord State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610,612 (Utah 1986), habeas corpus
granted on other grounds by 830 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1992).
In any event, the rule adopted in Johnson controls this case. Johnson unequivocally
and unambiguously held that "statements made prior to or during the commission of a crime"
are not subject to the corpus delicti rule. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162-63. The court explained
that "[w]hatever the rule as to the need for caution in admitting inculpatory statements made
after the crime, there seems to be little need for extraordinary protective measures for
statements made before or during the crime's commission." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162-63.
This is because statements made before or during a crime are not admissions or confessions.
Indeed, in some instances, such statements may actually constitute part of the actus reas or
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prosecution for using passport secured hy false statements, the defendant's pre-crime fal-v
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believes that her daughter's testimony lacked credibility She also presents no compelling
reason lot this court to depart
111is I "null I. hi
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' . v cum, uiciciuie, must conclude that the statements

defendant made to her daughter and other family members before leaving Idaho r
November 1 may be used in determining whether the corpus delicti was established.
Dejendat, «statements to Sergeantn*
*r t

o '\Hn iviuimnjj, In Malii »» Nnvrinhn

- k •* • e had been driving around with Pinder and

that she had left him in Las Vegas the day before (R.
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Defendant also told

Hendricks that she had given Pinder her .380 Browning semiautomatic handgun
111

1 I I " 11 Because these admis:i

mi: 11; i "ii" in, in delicti must he established independent of them. See Johnson, 821 P.2dat 1163.
The issue, therefore, is whether the other evidence at trial, including defendant's
statements to her daughter, husband, and father, before and during tne .
concealed defendant, proved ly deal and v on v Hieing, n. HICJK.V
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a damage [had] been done" and that the wrong had been "effected by a criminal agency."
Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162. As explained below, it did.
C.

Evidence independent of defendant's post-crime statements supported the
corpus delicti by clear and convincing evidence.

As stated, defendant was convicted of obstructing justice under two alternative
theories, both unanimously found by the jury. The elements specifically found by the jury
were those required under the statute: 1) that defendant knew that Pinder had committed
aggravated murder or murder; 2) that defendant had the intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of Pinder for murder, and
having that intent 3) defendant harbored or concealed Pinder, and 4) defendant provided
Pinder with a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or
apprehension (R. 105-06). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1999). Under the statute a
finding of either (3) or (4) in conjunction with the other elements was sufficient to convict
defendant of obstructing justice. Id. Thus, for defendant's conviction to stand, independent
evidence must support the corpus delicti of either (3) or (4), but not both.
Although the corpus delicti rule does not require independent proof of every element,
see Cazier, 521 P.2d at 555, the evidence in this case does support each element independent
of defendant's post-crime statements. This brief will therefore address the evidence
according to each element.
Defendant knew Pinder had committed murder. Defendant called Melissa on
Monday, October 26, and told her that Pinder and Ruiz had been gone all night (R. 211:75,
24
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hail iI • inal

i ;•.•- us.

^ i .aat•

< •* -

turning uie >^\L \<_ o v u I |i< In i t'R "' I I I I " J \ I "'i

ntervW

efendant gave Pinder an alibi for the

night of the murders even though that information had not yet been publicized (R 211:164,
246-47,2 72-74) Defendant acknowledged at trial that Pinder was the most likely source for
knowing which night the murders occurred (l(, 1II1
I tken toui'lhiM llm* I n g o i n g i/videnn 1 establish

• rand convincing evidence

that defendant knew Pinder had committed the murders.
Defendant intended to hinder, prevent\ or delay Pinder 9s discovery or apprehension,
™f erroneously asserts that her telephone call--, MM 111 .i< rl 1111 lulu i i niipi IMI i 11 n ^ i U
Mnder with the intent to hinder or delay his
apprehension or discovery

Bi Aplt. 16-19. To the contrary, the record contains ample

evidence of defendant's intent, Defendant testified that on Halloween evening one of
Finder's lawyers advised him to i etui n In I Idih I U J1*,! 1 J" \ I lusl In Inn h .n iiiii1 InLtho iII11

Pinder, defendant told her daughter that they were going to drive to Utah in defendant's truck
because the police would be less likely to stop them than if they were in Pinder's truck (R.
211:84).3 The jury could reasonably infer from defendant's testimony and this statement that
defendant knew that police were looking for Pinder and wanted to question him, but that
defendant and Pinder intended to delay any meeting.
Defendant claims that Sergeant Hendricks' testimony that he was negotiating with
Pinder's lawyers to meet with Pinder negates any intent on her part to hinder or delay. Br.
Aplt. 16. The opposite is true. Hendricks testified that his discussions with Pinder's lawyers,
was "[n]ot so much negotiating terms in which he may come talk to me, I was trying to get
them to convince [Pinder] to come talk to me or put me in touch with him either by telephone
or in person, somehow" (R. 211:175). Defendant testified that she met with Pinder and his
lawyers in Salt Lake City on November 2,1998 (R. 211:237,242). She then testified that
between that day and November 4, the day of the KSL interview, they stayed in an Ogden
motel and that Pinder called his attorneys three or four times a day (R. 211:242). Defendant
claimed they were "just waiting to see what happens" (R. 211:242). Given the foregoing, it
is difficult to believe that defendant was not aware that police were looking for Pinder.

defendant's brief does not specify this statement as falling under the corpus
delicti rule. The rule clearly does not apply to this statement, however, because it was
made before or during the commission of defendant's crime. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 116263. Defendant's testimony that Pinder's attorney advised him to return to Utah is also not
covered by the corpus delicti rule because the rule applies only to extrajudicial statements.
See Weldon, 6 Utah 2d at 373, 314 P.2d at 354.
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utn«\ she called
Melissa several times, asking whether the police had come and what they had taken, but
never telling Melissa where she was and how Melissa could contact her (R. 211:84-87) Her
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ideotaped interview in the middle of the night, and then immediately fled to Nevada where
defendant gave a false license plate number on the motel registration card All this evidence
evinces defendant's knowledge that police were .ooKihg ,.; . .,, :.
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defendant by providing him with her truck so that they would not be stopped, and by driving
Pinder to Nevada where she used a false license plate number to register (K, J! 11 K4, ) y) • / ,»i 11
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I n us I HI;' ni i ini • in Imission to Hendrick • • ! * • defendant testified that they drove to Nc ^ada in
her 4-Runner and that she dropped Pinder off at a truck stop just outside Las Vegas (R
211::: 247-49). Second, the State introduced evidence that defendant had registered hensti 1 .in m I
mount pei son in
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'• I though defendant claims that she

Iroppod Pinder offbefore she registered in Mesquite, the jury could have reasonably inferred
that it would have been impossible for her to have left the KSL interview in Salt I ake after
midnight, drive past Mesquite to Las Vegas, and then return,, to Mesqui

27

before 7:00 a.m. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to show that Pinder was with
defendant when she registered in Mesquite and that she helped to conceal him by writing a
false license plate number on the registration card.
By establishing this final element of obstructing justice, the State independently
proved the corpus delicti. However, as explained below, the State also proved the corpus
delicti of the second alternative.
Defendant provided Pinder with transportation or a weapon. The evidence was
uncontroverted that defendant provided Pinder with transportation when she let him use her
truck to leave Idaho. Defendant testified that they took her truck (R. 211:271). The KSL
videotape showed defendant and Pinder driving away in her truck (R. 211:157-58). The
registration card at the Mesquite motel stated that defendant was driving a white Toyota 4Runner, although it reflected a false license plate number and state (R. 211:159-60). Coupled
with the intent to hinder or delay Pinder's apprehension, this evidence amply proved the
corpus delicti of this, alternative.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the corpus delicti of
obstructing justice by giving the offender a gun. Because the evidence overwhelmingly
proves that defendant obstructed justice by providing Pinder with transportation, this Court
need not address this claim. Evidence that defendant gave Pinder a gun is mere surplusage.
In any event, the evidence did sufficiently corroborate defendant's admission to
Sergeant Hendricks that she gave her gun to Pinder. First, defendant admitted at trial, and
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the time in question (R. 211:88, 144, 249, 278). Defendant argues that the independent
evidence fails on this point because there was never any evidence that Pinder possessed the
gun at the time he was apprehended Br ,'\pli I ' IN
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give the gun to Pinder, but that she gave it to Pinder's father, who lives in Park City, before
they drove to Nevada (R. 211:210, 217 249, 25 M Defendant claimed that Finder's father
returned the gun to her two months I. •
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According to defendant's testimony, there would have been no time for her to give the gun
to Pinder's father because, as defendant acknowledged, they drove directly from KSI to
Mesquite
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took a detour to Park City. Since Pinder's father could not have had the gun, and defendant
conceded at trial that the gun was out of her possession during that time, the jury could have
reasonably inferred that defendant had in fact given the gun lo I uuki
>ti: m\ M led siilt"I\ iiiiiii hiM posl nnne statements. Rather,the
g t a t e prociuced more than ample evidence to pro\ e the corpus delicti of her crime
independent of those statements.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE
Defendant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction.
Contrary to defendant's claim, and as shown above, the evidence was more than sufficient
to support a conviction for obstructing justice.
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court
views "'the evidence and all inferences which may be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997) (quoting
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983)); State in the interest of IFX, 803 P.2d 1254,
1255 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). This Court "will upset the
jury verdict 'only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he . . . was convicted.'" State v. Wright, 893 P.2d
1113,1117 (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,472 (Utah App. 1991)).
The Court will not weigh conflicting evidence, substitute its own judgment on the credibility
of the witnesses for that of the jury, or reverse merely because there is contradictory evidence
or conflicting inferences. State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19,22 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sherard,
818 P.2d 554,557 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). Accord State
v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).
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transportation and or a weapon.
Defendant suggests that the evidence did not show that she intended to hinder Pinder's
apprehension because as soon as they learned he Iliad been t Iiaigetl with the murders, she
dinppcd him nil iiiiiil iiiliiiiiieiil ill lil iliMi Hi \|ilt Vi } "' I tin cKtentth.it defendant
that she ceased to help Pinder as soon as she discovered that he was a criminal, the evide^~~
refutes that claim \ s explained in Point I, supra, the evidence overwhelmingly suppoi: ted
the conclusion that defendant knew Pinder had committed the murders while they were still
IL

To the extent that defendant argues that she could not be guilty because defendant had
not yet been named a suspect or charged, she misapprehends the elements of obstructing
justice Obstructing justice does not require that the of tender be a named suspect or actually

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306. It requires only that the defendant knou s^: :iie offender
committed a crime and that the defendant harbor or conceal the offender w itli the intent to
hinder or delay apprehension. I < J" CI s ai 1> , the statute applies to those situations a here,, as
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here, the defendant, knowing that a crime has been committed, assists the offender who has
not yet been charged to evade or delay capture by hiding him or helping him leave the
jurisdiction. The fact that the offender has not yet been named a suspect or charged does not
change the nature of obstructing justice.
Here, as already demonstrated, the evidence was compelling that defendant knew that
Pinder had committed aggravated murder or murder and that she harbored and concealed him
and provided him transportation for the purpose of delaying or hindering his apprehension.
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant' s
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this P^

day of /ItMU^

2000.

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

.AURA B. DUPAIX
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDUM A
Special Verdict

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.
BARBARA J. DEHART,
Defendant.

Criminal No. 981800119

If youfindthe defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, GUILTY, you mustfillout this Special
Verdict form. If youfindthe defendant NOT GUILTY, you do not need tofillout this Special
Verdict form.

We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled case,findthe defendant, Barbara J. DeHart,
GUILTY of Obstructing Justice, as charged in the First Amended Information. In arriving at
our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree:
1. That in the time period from on or about October 25, 1998, through November 7,
1998;
2. The defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, knew that another had committed either Aggravated
Murder or Murder in Duchesne County, State of Utah; and
3. The defendant, Barbara J. DeHart, had the intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the crimes
of either Aggravated Murder or Murder; AND

4. Please select one or more of the following as applicable:
_^_A.

In arriving at our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree that the
Defendant Barbara J. DeHart HARBORED OR CONCEALED
THE OFFENDER.

B.

In arriving at our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree that the
Defendant Barbara J. DeHart PROVIDED THE OFFENDER
WITH A WEAPON, TRANSPORTATION, DISGUISE, OR
OTHER MEANS FOR AVOIDING DISCOVERY OR
APPREHENSION.

C.

In arriving at our GUILTY verdict, we unanimously agree that the
Defendant Barbara J. DeHart CONCEALED, DESTROYED, OR
ALTERED ANY PHYSICAL EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT AID
IN THE DISCOVERY, APPREHENSION, OR CONVICTION
OF THE PERSON.
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